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Abstract
In reliability engineering, data about failure events is often scarce. To arrive at meaningful
estimates for the reliability of a system, it is therefore often necessary to also include expert
information in the analysis, which is straightforward in the Bayesian approach by using an
informative prior distribution. A problem called prior-data conflict then can arise: observed
data seem very surprising from the viewpoint of the prior, i.e., information from data is
in conflict with prior assumptions. Models based on conjugate priors can be insensitive to
prior-data conflict, in the sense that the spread of the posterior distribution does not increase
in case of such a conflict, thus conveying a false sense of certainty. An approach to mitigate
this issue is presented, by considering sets of prior distributions to model limited knowledge
on Weibull distributed component lifetimes, treating systems with arbitrary layout using the
survival signature. This approach can be seen as a robust Bayesian procedure or imprecise
probability method that reflects surprisingly early or late component failures by wider system
reliability bounds.
Keywords: System Reliability, Imprecise Probability, Survival Signature, Robust Bayesian
Methods, Remaining Useful Life
1 INTRODUCTION
In reliability engineering, a central task is to describe the reliability of a complex system.
This is usually done by determining the reliability function R(t), in other contexts also known
as the survival function, giving the probability that the system has not failed by time t:
Rsys(t) = P (Tsys ≥ t) , (1)
where Tsys is the random variable giving the failure time of the system. Based on the
distribution of Tsys, which can also be expressed in terms of the cumulative distribution
function Fsys(t) = 1− Rsys(t), decisions about, e.g., scheduling of maintenance work can be
made.
Often, there is no failure data for the system itself (e.g., if the system is a prototype, or
the system is used under unique circumstances), but there is some information about failure
times for the components the system is made of. The proposed method allows to analyse
systems of arbitrary system structures, i.e., any combination and nesting of series, parallel,
k-out-of-n, or bridge-type arrangements, by use of the survival signature (Coolen and Coolen-
Maturi 2012). In doing so, the present paper extends similar previous work which focused on
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a simple parallel system with homogeneous components (Walter et al. 2015). In this paper,
we assume that components can be divided into K different groups, and components within
each group k (k = 1, . . . , K) can be assumed to be exchangeable, i.e., to follow the same
failure time distribution. Components of group k are denoted as type k components, and are
assumed to be independent from components of other types. Type k component lifetimes
T ki (i = 1, . . . , nk) are assumed as Weibull distributed with type-specific parameters, where
the shape parameter βk is known and the scale parameter λk is unknown.
Focusing on a running system, we assume that observations consist solely of the failure
times of components in this system up to time tnow, such that the failure times of components
that have not failed by tnow are right-censored, and calculate Rsys(t | t > tnow) = P (Tsys ≥ t |
t > tnow), which can be used to determine the remaining useful life of the system (in short
RUL, see, e.g., Ahmadzadeh and Lundberg 2014).
The Bayesian approach allows to base estimation of the component failure distributions
on both data and further knowledge not given by the data, the latter usually provided in the
form of expert knowledge. This knowledge is encoded in form of a so-called prior distribution,
which here, as the shape parameter βk is assumed to be known, is a distribution on the scale
parameter λk. Expert knowledge is especially important when there is very few data on
the components, as only with its help meaningful estimates for the system reliability can
be made. Due to the iterative nature of the Bayesian framework, it is also possible to use
a set of posteriors based on component test data as the set of priors instead of a purely
expert-based set of priors as discussed so far. The component test data may also contain
right-censored observations, which can be treated in the same way as those from the running
system (see Section 4.1 for details).
The choice of prior distribution to encode given expert knowledge is often debatable, and
a specific choice of prior is difficult to justify. A way to deal with this is to employ sensitivity
analysis, i.e., studying the effect of different choices of prior distribution on the quantities of
interest (in our case, the system reliability function, which, in Bayesian terms, is a posterior
predictive distribution). This idea has been explored in systematic sensitivity analysis, or
robust Bayesian methods (for an overview on this approach, see, e.g., Berger et al. 1994 or
R´ıos Insua and Ruggeri 2000).
The work presented here can be seen as belonging to the robust Bayesian approach
since it uses sets of priors. However, our focus and interpretation is slightly different, as
we consider the result of our procedure, sets of reliability functions, as the proper result,
while a robust Bayesian would base his analyses on a single reliability function from the
set in case (s)he was able to conclude that quantities of interest are not ‘too sensitive’
to the choice of prior. In contrast, our viewpoint is rooted in the theory of imprecise or
interval probability (Walley 1991; Augustin et al. 2014), where sets of distributions are
used to express the precision of probability statements themselves: the smaller the set, the
more precise the probability statement. Indeed, the system reliability function Rsys(t) is a
collection of probability statements, and a small set forRsys(t) will indicate that the reliability
of the system can be can quantified quite precisely, while a large set will indicate that
available knowledge about Tsys is rather shaky. In line with imprecise or interval probability
methods, the method provides, for each t, a lower reliability Rsys(t) = P (Tsys ≥ t), and an
upper reliability Rsys(t) = P (Tsys ≥ t). Sections 3 and 4 will explain how these bounds
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are obtained based on sets of prior distributions on the scale parameters of the component
lifetime distributions.
The central merit of the proposed method is that it adequately reflects prior-data conflict
(see, e.g., Evans and Moshonov 2006), i.e. the conflict that can arise between prior assump-
tions on component lifetimes and observed behaviour of components in the system under
study. As will be shown in Section 2, when taking the standard choice of a conjugate prior,
prior-data conflict is ignored, as the spread of the posterior distribution does not increase
in case of such a conflict, ultimately conveying a false sense of certainty by communicating
that the reliability of a system can be quantified quite precisely when in fact it can not. In
contrast, the proposed method will indicate prior-data conflict by wider bounds for Rsys(t).
This behaviour is obtained by a specific choice for the set of priors (see Walter and Augustin
2009 and Walter 2013 §3.1.4) which leads to larger sets of posterior distributions when prior
knowledge and data are in conflict (see Section 3 for more details). If a prior based on com-
ponent test data is used, such prior-data conflict sensitivity furthermore allows to uncover
a conflict between current observations in the running system and past observations from
component tests.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a Bayesian analysis for Weibull com-
ponent lifetimes with fixed shape parameter is described, illustrating the issue of prior-data
conflict. Section 3 then details the use of sets of priors for the scale parameter λk of the
Weibull distribution, showing how this mitigates the prior-data conflict issue for λk. Sec-
tion 4 then develops a method to calculate system reliability bounds for a running system
based on sets of priors for λk. Section 5 discusses elicitation, by giving guidelines on how
to choose prior parameter bounds that reflect expert information on components. Section 6
contains examples illustrating the merits of our method, by studying the effect of surprisingly
early or late component failures, showing that observations in conflict to prior assumptions
indeed lead to more cautious system reliability predictions. Section 7 concludes the paper
by summarizing results and indicating avenues for further research.
2 BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF WEIBULL LIFETIMES
Consider a system with components of k = 1, . . . , K different types; for each type k, there
are nk exchangeable components in the system. For each type k component, we assume for its
lifetime T ki (i = 1, . . . , nk, k = 1, . . . , K) a Weibull distribution with fixed shape parameter
βk > 0, in short T
k
i | λk ∼Wei(βk, λk), with density and cdf
f(tki | λk) =
βk
λk
(tki )
βk−1e−
(tki )
βk
λk , (2)
F (tki | λk) = 1− e−
(tki )
βk
λk = P (T ki ≤ tki | λk) , (3)
where λk > 0 and t > 0.
The shape parameter βk determines whether the hazard rate is increasing (βk > 1) or
decreasing (βk < 1) over time. For βk = 1, one obtains the Exponential distribution with
constant hazard rate as a special case. The value for βk will often be clear from practical
considerations.
The scale parameter λk can be interpreted through the relation
E[T ki | λk] = λ1/βkk Γ(1 + 1/βk) . (4)
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For encoding expert knowledge about the reliability of the components, one needs to assign
a prior distribution over the scale parameter λk. A convenient choice is to use the inverse
Gamma distribution, commonly parametrized in terms of the hyperparameters ak > 0 and
bk > 0:
f(λk | ak, bk) = (bk)
ak
Γ(ak)
λ−ak−1k e
− bk
λk (5)
in short, λk | ak, bk ∼ IG(ak, bk). The inverse Gamma is convenient because it is a conjugate
prior, i.e., the posterior obtained by Bayes’ rule is again inverse Gamma and thus easily
tractable; the prior parameters only need to be updated to obtain the posterior parameters.
In the standard Bayesian approach, one has to fix a prior by choosing values for ak
and bk to encode specific prior information about component lifetimes. In our imprecise
approach, we allow instead these parameters to vary in a set, this is advantageous also
because expert knowledge is often vague, and it is difficult for the expert(s) to pin down
precise hyperparameter values. For the definition of the hyperparameter set, we use however
a parametrization in terms of n(0) > 1 and y(0) > 0 instead of ak and bk, where we drop
the index k for the discussion about the prior model in the following, keeping in mind
that each component type will have its own specific parameters. We use n(0) = a − 1 and
y(0) = b/n(0), where y(0) can be interpreted as the prior guess for the scale parameter λ, as
E[λ | n(0), y(0)] = y(0). This parametrization also makes the nature of the combination of
prior information and data through Bayes’ rule more clear: After observing n component
lifetimes t = (t1, . . . , tn), the updated parameters are
n(n) = n(0) + n , y(n) =
n(0)y(0) + τ(t)
n(0) + n
, (6)
where τ(t) =
∑n
i=1(ti)
β. We thus have
λ | n(0), y(0), t ∼ IG(n(0) + n+ 1, n(0)y(0) + τ(t)). (7)
From the simple update rule (6), we see that y(n) is a weighted average of the prior parameter
y(0) and the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator τ(t)/n, with weights proportional to n(0)
and n, respectively. n(0) can thus be interpreted as a prior strength or pseudocount, indicating
how much our prior guess should weigh against the n observations. Furthermore, Var[λ |
n(0), y(0)] = (y(0))2/(1 − 1/n(0)), so for fixed y(0), the higher n(0), the more probability mass
is concentrated around y(0).
However, the weighted average structure for y(n) is behind the problematic behaviour
in case of prior-data conflict. Assume that from expert knowledge we expect to have a
mean component lifetime of 9 weeks. Using (4), with β = 2 we obtain y(0) = 103.13. We
choose n(0) = 2, so our prior guess for the mean component lifetime counts like having two
observations with this mean. If we now have a sample of two observations with surprisingly
early failure times t1 = 1 and t2 = 2, using (6) we get n
(2) = 4 and y(2) = 1
4
(2 · 103.13 +
12 + 22) = 52.82, so our posterior expectation for the scale parameter λ is 52.82, equivalent
to a mean component lifetime of 6.44 weeks. The posterior standard deviation (sd) for
λ is 60.99. Compared to the prior standard deviation of 145.85, the posterior expresses
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Figure 1. Prior and posterior cdf for λ given surprising observations; the conflict
between prior assumptions and data is averaged out, with a more pointed posterior
giving a false sense of certainty.
now more confidence that mean lifetimes are around y(2) = 52.82 than the prior had about
y(0) = 103.13. This irritating conclusion is illustrated in Figure 1; the posterior cdf is shifted
halfway towards the values for λ that the two observations suggest (the ML estimator for λ
would be 2.5), and is steeper than the prior (so the pdf is more pointed), thus conveying a
false sense of certainty about λ. We would obtain almost the same posterior distribution if
we had assumed the mean component lifetime to be 7 weeks (so y(0) = 62.39), and observed
lifetimes t1 = 6, t2 = 7 in line with our expectations. It seems unreasonable to make the
same probability statements on component lifetimes in these two fundamentally different
scenarios.
Note that this is a general problem in Bayesian analysis with canonical conjugate priors.
For such priors, the same update formula (6) applies, and so conflict is averaged out, for
details see Walter and Augustin (2009) and Walter (2013, §3.1.4 and §A.1.2).
3 MODELS REFLECTING SURPRISING DATA
Despite this issue of ignoring prior-data conflict, the tractability of the update step is a
very attractive feature of the conjugate setting. As was shown by Walter and Augustin (2009)
(see also Walter 2013, §3.1), it is possible to retain tractability and to have a meaningful
reaction to prior-data conflict when using sets of priors generated by varying both n(0) and
y(0). Then, the magnitude of the set of posteriors, and with it the precision of posterior
probability statements, will be sensitive to the degree of prior-data conflict, i.e. leading to
more cautious probability statements when prior-data conflict occurs.
Instead of a single prior guess y(0) for the mean component lifetimes, we will now assume
a range of prior guesses [y(0), y(0)], and also a range [n(0), n(0)] of pseudocounts, i.e., we now
consider the set of priors
M(0) := {f(λ | n(0), y(0)) | n(0) ∈ [n(0), n(0)], y(0) ∈ [y(0), y(0)]} (8)
5
Surprising Observations Unsurprising Observations
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300
λ
F(λ
) Prior
Posterior
Figure 2. Set of prior and posterior cdfs for λ for two surprising observations t1 = 1,
t2 = 2 (left) and two unsurprising observations t1 = 10, t2 = 11 (right).
to express our prior knowledge about component lifetimes. Each of the priors f(λ | n(0), y(0))
is then updated to the posterior f(λ | n(0), y(0), t) = f(λ | n(n), y(n)) by using (6), such that
the set of posteriorsM(n) can be written asM(n) = {f(λ | n(n), y(n)) | n(0) ∈ [n(0), n(0)], y(0) ∈
[y(0), y(0)]}. This procedure of using Bayes’ Rule element by element is seen as self-evident
in the robust Bayesian literature, but can be formally justified as being coherent (a self-
consistency property) in the framework of imprecise probability, where it is known as Gen-
eralized Bayes’ Rule (Walley 1991, §6.4).
Technically, it is crucial to consider a range of pseudocounts [n(0), n(0)] along with the
range of prior guesses [y(0), y(0)], as only then τ(t)/n 6∈ [y(0), y(0)] leads to the set of posteriors
being larger and hence reflecting prior-data conflict.
Continuing the example from Section 2 and Figure 1, assume now for the mean component
lifetimes the range 9 to 11 weeks, this corresponds to [y(0), y(0)] = [103.13, 154.06]. Choosing
[n(0), n(0)] = [2, 5] means to value this information on mean component lifetimes as equivalent
to having seen two to five observations. Compare now the set of posteriors obtained from
observing t1 = 1, t2 = 2 (as before), see Figure 2 (left), and t1 = 10, t2 = 11, see Figure 2
(right). There is now a clear difference between the two scenarios of observations in line with
expectations and observations in conflict. In the prior-data conflict case, the set of posteriors
(blue) is shifted towards the left, but has about the same size as the set of priors (yellow),
and so posterior quantification of reliability has the same precision, despite having seen two
observations. Instead, in the no conflict case, the set of posteriors is smaller than the set of
priors, such that the two observations have increased the precision of reliability statements.
As each posterior inM(n) corresponds to a predictive distribution for Tsys, we will have a
set of reliability functions Rsys(t). The derivation of Rsys(t) for systems with K component
types and arbitrary layout will be given in Section 4 below. This will include, in contrast to
previous studies using sets of priors of type (8), the treatment of censored observations. More
specifically, we consider the case of non-informative right censoring, where the censoring
process is independent of the failure process.
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4 ROBUST RELIABILITY FOR COMPLEX SYSTEMS VIA THE SURVIVAL
SIGNATURE
Consider now a system of arbitrary layout, consisting of components of K types. This
system is observed until time tnow, leading to censored observation of lifetimes of compo-
nents within the system, and we will explain in Section 4.1 how the scale parameter λk for
component type k can be estimated in this situation. Section 4.2 describes then how the
system reliability function can be efficiently obtained using the survival signature. For this,
we need the posterior predictive distribution of the number of components that function
at times t > tnow, which we will derive in Section 4.3. Finally, in Section 4.4 we describe
how the lower and upper bound for the system reliability function are obtained when prior
parameters (n
(0)
k , y
(0)
k ) vary in sets Π
(0)
k = [n
(0)
k , n
(0)
k ] × [y(0)k , y
(0)
k ], defining sets M(0)k of prior
distributions over λk, as introduced in Section 3.
4.1 Bayesian Estimation of Component Scale Parameter with Right-censored
Lifetimes
Consider observing a system until tnow, where the system has K different types of com-
ponents, and for each type k there are nk components in the system. Denoting the number
of type k components that have failed by tnow by ek, there are nk − ek components still
functioning at tnow. We denote the corresponding vector of observations by
tkek;nk =
(
tk1, . . . , t
k
ek︸ ︷︷ ︸
ekfailure times
, t+now, . . . , t
+
now︸ ︷︷ ︸
nk−ekcensored obs.
)
, (9)
where t+ indicates a right-censored observation.
According to Bayes’ rule, multiplying the prior density and the likelihood (which accounts
for right-censored observations through the cdf terms) gives a term proportional to the
density of the posterior distribution for λk:
f(λk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) ∝ f(λk)
[
1− F (tnow | λk)
]nk−ek ek∏
i=1
f(tki | λk) (10)
Conjugacy is preserved and we get λk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk ∼ IG(n
(n)
k + 1, n
(n)
k y
(n)
k ), where
n
(n)
k + 1 = n
(0)
k + ek + 1 (11)
n
(n)
k y
(n)
k = n
(0)
k y
(0)
k + (nk − ek)(tnow)β +
ek∑
i=1
(tki )
β (12)
are the updated parameters of the inverse gamma distribution.
4.2 System Reliability using the Survival Signature
The structure of complex systems can be visualized by reliability block diagrams, an
example is given in Figure 3. Components are represented by boxes or nodes, and the system
works when a path from the left end to the right exists which passes only through working
components. In a system with n components, the state of the components can be expressed
by the state vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, with xi = 1 if the ith component functions
and xi = 0 if not. The structure function φ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, defined for all possible x,
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takes the value 1 if the system functions and 0 if the system does not function for state
vector x (Barlow and Proschan 1975). Most real-life systems are coherent, which means
that φ(x) is non-decreasing in any of the components of x, so system functioning cannot
be improved by worse performance of one or more of its components. Furthermore, one can
usually assume that φ(0, . . . , 0) = 0 and φ(1, . . . , 1) = 1.
The survival signature (Coolen and Coolen-Maturi 2012) is a summary of the structure
function for systems with K groups of exchangeable components. Denoted by Φ(l1, . . . , lK),
with lk = 0, 1, . . . , nk for k = 1, . . . , K, it is defined as the probability for the event that the
system functions given that precisely lk of its nk components of type k function, for each
k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Essentially, this creates a K-dimensional partition for the event Tsys > t,
such that Rsys(t) = P (Tsys > t) can be calculated using the law of total probability,
P (Tsys > t) =
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
P (Tsys > t | C1t = l1, . . . , CKt = lK)P
( K⋂
k=1
{Ckt = lk}
)
=
n1∑
l1=0
· · ·
nK∑
lK=0
Φ(l1, . . . , lK)P
( K⋂
k=1
{Ckt = lk}
)
=
n1∑
l1=0
· · ·
nK∑
lK=0
Φ(l1, . . . , lK)
K∏
k=1
P (Ckt = lk) , (13)
where P (Ckt = lk) is the (predictive) probability that exactly lk components of type k
function at time t, and the last equality holds as we assume that components of different
types are independent. Note that for coherent systems, the survival signature Φ(l1, . . . , lK)
is non-decreasing in each lk.
4.3 Posterior Predictive Distribution
In calculating the system reliability using (13), the component-specific predictive proba-
bilities P (Ckt = lk) need to use all information available at time tnow, which, in the Bayesian
framework, are given by the posterior predictive distribution P (Ckt = lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk),
lk = 0, 1, . . . , nk − ek. (Remember that ek type k components have failed by tnow, such
that there can be at most nk − ek working components beyond time tnow.) This posterior
predictive distribution is obtained as
P (Ckt = lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk)
=
(
nk − ek
lk
)∫ [
P (T k > t | T k > tnow, λk)
]lk×[
P (T k ≤ t | T k > tnow, λk)
]nk−ek−lkf(λk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) dλk . (14)
Now, by the Weibull assumption (3), one has
P (T k ≤ t | T k > tnow, λk) = P (tnow < T
k ≤ t | λk)
P (T k > tnow | λk)
=
F (t | λk)− F (tnow | λk)
1− F (tnow | λk) = 1− e
− tβk−(tnow)βk
λk . (15)
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With this and the posterior (7) substituted into (14), this gives
P (Ckt = lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk)
=
(
nk − ek
lk
)∫ [
e
− tβk−(tnow)βk
λk
]lk[
1− e−
tβk−(tnow)βk
λk
]nk−ek−lk×(
n
(n)
k y
(n)
k
)n(n)k +1
Γ(n
(n)
k + 1)
λ
−(n(n)k +1)−1
k e
−n
(n)
k
y
(n)
k
λk dλk
=
(
nk − ek
lk
) nk−ek−lk∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
nk − ek − lk
j
)(
n
(n)
k y
(n)
k
)n(n)k +1
Γ(n
(n)
k + 1)
×
∫
λ
−(n(n)k +1)−1
k exp
{
− (lk + j)(t
βk − (tnow)βk) + n(n)k y(n)k
λk
}
dλk . (16)
The terms remaining under the integral form the core of an inverse gamma distribution (5)
with parameters n
(n)
k + 1 and n
(n)
k y
(n)
k + (lk + j)(t
βk − (tnow)βk)), allowing to solve the integral
using the corresponding normalization constant. We thus have, for lk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nk − ek},
P (Ckt = lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk)
=
(
nk − ek
lk
) nk−ek−lk∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
nk − ek − lk
j
)(
n
(n)
k y
(n)
k
n
(n)
k y
(n)
k + (lk + j)
(
tβk − (tnow)βk
))n
(n)
k +1
=
nk−ek−lk∑
j=0
(−1)j (nk − ek)!
lk!j!(nk − ek − lk − j)!
(
n
(n)
k y
(n)
k
n
(n)
k y
(n)
k + (lk + j)
(
tβk − (tnow)βk
))n
(n)
k +1
=
nk−ek−lk∑
j=0
(−1)j (nk − ek)!
lk!j!(nk − ek − lk − j)!×(
n
(0)
k y
(0)
k +
∑ek
i=1(t
k
i )
βk + (nk − ek)(tnow)βk
n
(0)
k y
(0)
k +
∑ek
i=1(t
k
i )
βk + (nk − ek − lk − j)(tnow)βk + (lk + j)tβk
)n(0)k +ek+1
.
(17)
These posterior predictive probabilities can also be expressed as a cumulative probability
mass function (cmf)
F (lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) = P (Ckt ≤ lk | n
(0)
k , y
(0)
k , t
k
ek;nk
) =
lk∑
j=0
P (Ckt = j | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) .
(18)
4.4 Optimizing over Sets of Parameters
Together with (17), (13) allows to calculate the system reliability Rsys(t | t > tnow) for
fixed prior parameters (n
(0)
k , y
(0)
k ), k = 1, . . . , K. In Section 3, we argued for using sets of
priors M(0), which allow for vague and incomplete prior knowledge, and provide prior-data
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conflict sensitivity. We will thus use, for each component type, a set of priors M(0)k defined
by varying (n
(0)
k , y
(0)
k ) in a prior parameter set Π
(0)
k = [n
(0)
k , n
(0)
k ]× [y(0)k , y
(0)
k ], and the objective
is to obtain the bounds
Rsys(t | t > tnow) = min
Π
(0)
1 ,...,Π
(0)
K
Rsys
(
t | t > tnow,∪Kk=1{Π(0)k , tkek;nk}
)
, (19)
Rsys(t | t > tnow) = max
Π
(0)
1 ,...,Π
(0)
K
Rsys
(
t | t > tnow,∪Kk=1{Π(0)k , tkek;nk}
)
, (20)
where we suppress in notation that Rsys(t | t > tnow) and Rsys(t | t > tnow) depend on prior
parameter sets and data.
(19) and (20) seem to suggest that a full 2K-dimensional box-constraint optimization is
necessary, but this is not the case. Remember that Φ(l1, . . . , lk) from (13) is non-decreasing in
each of its arguments l1, . . . , lK , so if there is stochastic dominance in F (lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk),
then there is, for each component type k, a prior parameter pair in Π
(0)
k that minimizes system
reliability, and a prior parameter pair in Π
(0)
k that maximizes system reliability, independently
of the other component types. Indeed, stochastic dominance in F (lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) is
provided for y
(0)
k . To see this, note that y
(0)
k gives the mean expected lifetime for type k
components. Thus, higher values for y
(0)
k mean higher expected lifetimes for the components,
which in turn increases the probability that many components survive until time t, and
with it, decreases the propability of few or no components surviving, so in total giving low
probability weight for low values of lk, and high probability weight for high values of lk.
Therefore, for any fixed value of n
(0)
k , the lower bound of F (lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) for all lk is
obtained with y
(0)
k , and the upper bound of F (lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) for all lk is obtained with
y(0)
k
. There is however no corresponding result for n
(0)
k , such that different values of n
(0)
k may
minimize (or maximize) F (lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) at different lk’s. Therefore, the n
(0)
k values for
lower and upper system reliability bounds are obtained by numeric optimization.
Writing out (13), one obtains
Rsys(t | t > tnow) = min
Π
(0)
1 ,...,Π
(0)
K
Rsys
(
t | t > tnow,∪Kk=1{Π(0)k , tkek;nk}
)
= min
n
(0)
1 ∈
[
n
(0)
1 ,n
(0)
1
]
...
n
(0)
K ∈
[
n
(0)
K ,n
(0)
K
]
n1−e1∑
l1=0
· · ·
nK−eK∑
lK=0
Φ(l1, . . . , lK)
K∏
k=1
P (Ckt = lk | n(0)k , y(0)k , tkek;nk) ,
(21)
such that a K-dimensional box-constraint optimization is needed to obtain Rsys(t | t > tnow).
The result for Rsys(t | t > tnow) is completely analogous. Computing time can furthermore
be saved by computing only those summation terms for which Φ(l1, . . . , lK) > 0.
We have implemented the method in the statistical computing environment R (R Core
Team 2016), using box-constraint optimization via option L-BFGS-B of optim, and intend to
release a package containing functions and code to reproduce all results and figures for the
examples in Section 6 below.
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5 ELICITATION OF PRIOR PARAMETER SETS
To represent expert knowledge on component failure times through bounds for y
(0)
k and
n
(0)
k , one can refer to the interpretations as given in Section 2: y
(0)
k is the prior expected value
of λk, where λk is linked to expected component lifetimes through (4). n
(0)
k can be seen as
pseudocount, indicating how strong expert knowledge is trusted in comparison to a sample
of size n. Crucially, the approach allows the expert to give ranges [y(0)
k
, y
(0)
k ] and [n
(0)
k , n
(0)
k ]
instead of requiring a precise answer.
It is also possible to directly link n
(0)
k and y
(0)
k to observed lifetimes using a prior predictive
distribution. Dropping the component index k for ease of notation, this is given by
f(t | n(0), y(0)) =
∫
f(t | λ)f(λ | n(0), y(0)) dλ
= β tβ−1 (n(0) + 1)
(n(0)y(0))n
(0)+1
(n(0)y(0) + tβ)n(0)+2
. (22)
Replacing the prior parameters n(0) and y(0) with their posterior counterparts n(n) and y(n)
as defined in (6), the effect of virtual observations on (22), or the corresponding reliability
function, can be determined. This allows to determine n(0) and y(0) through a number of
‘what-if’ scenarios, by asking the expert to state what (s)he would expect to learn from
observing certain virtual data.
This strategy is known as pre-posterior analysis, being first advocated by Good (1965,
p. 19). We recommend to check whether the effects of Π
(0)
k on the inference of interest (this
may not always be the full reliability function) reasonably reflect an expert’s beliefs before
the data and in case some specific data become available, both data agreeing with initial
beliefs and surprising data. Essentially, we advise to do an analysis like in our examples in
Section 6 below, using hypothetical data.
To elicit a meaningful prior distribution, or a set of prior distributions, it is important
to ask questions which enable experts to stay close to their actual expertise. Coolen (1996)
discussed the possibility of generalizing the usual conjugate prior distributions, for parame-
ters of exponential family models, by including pseudo-data which are right-censored. If the
real data set contains such values, then such generalized priors do not lead to more com-
putational complexities, while they can have several advantages. In addition to providing
slightly more general classes of prior distributions through an additional hyperparameter,
they may enable more realistic elicitation of expert judgements, for example if the expert
has no experience with certain components past a specific life time. For more details we
refer to Coolen (1996), it should be noted that adopting such generalized prior distributions
may also provide more flexibility for modelling the effects of prior-data conflict, this is left
as a topic for future research.
6 EXAMPLES
As illustrative example, consider a simplified automotive brake system with four types
of component. The master brake cylinder (M) activates all four wheel brake cylinders (C1
– C4), which in turn actuate a braking pad assembly each (P1 – P4). The hand brake
mechanism (H) goes directly to the brake pad assemblies P3 and P4; the car brakes when at
least one brake pad assembly is actuated. The system layout is depicted in Figure 3, with
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MC1
C2
C3
C4
P1
P2
P3
P4
H
Figure 3. Reliability block diagram for a simplified automotive brake system, with
those components marked that we assume to fail in the three scenarios.
M H C P Φ M H C P Φ
1 0 1 1 0.25 1 0 2 1 0.50
1 0 1 2 0.50 1 0 2 2 0.83
1 0 1 3 0.75 1 0 3 1 0.75
0 1 0 1 0.50 1 1 0 1 0.50
0 1 0 2 0.83 1 1 0 2 0.83
0 1 1 1 0.62 1 1 1 1 0.62
0 1 1 2 0.92 1 1 1 2 0.92
0 1 2 1 0.75 1 1 2 1 0.75
0 1 2 2 0.97 1 1 2 2 0.97
0 1 3 1 0.88 1 1 3 1 0.88
Table 1. Survival signature values 6∈ {0, 1} for the simplified automotive brake system
depicted in Figure 3.
those components marked that we assume to fail in each of the three cases studied below.
The values for Φ 6∈ {0, 1} for the complete system are given in Table 1.
A fixed prior setting, described in Section 6.1, will be combined with three different
data scenarios, where one observes failure times in accordance with prior expectations in
the first case (Section 6.2), surprisingly early failures in the second case (Section 6.3), and
surprisingly late failures in the third case (Section 6.4). In each case, it is assumed that
C2, C3, P2 and P3 fail, only the failure times are varied, investigating the effect of learning
about these failures on the component level. Effects on posterior reliability bounds for the
running system are then discussed for all three cases in Section 6.5.
6.1 Prior assumptions
The prior assumptions, which one can imagine to be determined by an expert, or by a
combination of expert knowledge and component test data, are given by the prior parameter
sets Π
(0)
k , k = M,H,C,P, as described in Table 2. There, E[T
k
i ] and E[T
k
i ] give the lower
and upper bound for expected component lifetimes, respectively, which then have been
transformed to bounds for the scale parameter using (4), resulting in y(0)
k
and y
(0)
k . For
example, according to the expert, the mean time to failure for component type M is between
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k βk E[T
k
i ] E[T
k
i ] y
(0)
k
y
(0)
k n
(0)
k n
(0)
k
M 2.5 5 8 75.4 244.1 2 5
H 1.2 2 20 2.5 39.2 1 10
C 2 8 10 81.5 127.3 1 5
P 1.5 3 4 6.1 9.3 1 10
Table 2. Prior parameter sets for the four component types.
5 and 8 time units, leading to y(0)
M
= 75.4 and y
(0)
M = 244.1, and the expert considers his
knowledge on these expected lifetime bounds as having the strength of at least 2 and at most
5 observations.
These prior assumptions for the four component types are visualized in Figure 4, showing
the sets of reliability functions corresponding to the prior predictive density (22). The figure
thus displays the bounds for the probability that a single component, having been put under
risk at time 0, will have failed by time t. The top left graph in Figure 8 shows what the
prior assumptions on components signify for the system, depicting the prior bounds for the
system reliability on a scale of time elapsed since system startup. For example, the prior
probability of the system to survive until time 10 is between 0.03% and 6.91%.
6.2 Case 1: failure times as expected
In the first case, we observe tC1 = 6, t
C
2 = 7, t
P
1 = 3, t
P
2 = 4, and observe the running
system until tnow = 8, i.e., t
M
1 = t
H
1 = t
C
3 = t
C
4 = t
P
3 = t
P
4 = 8
+. (Note that component failure
times are numbered by order, not by component number in the system layout.) These
observations correspond more or less to prior expectations, and the corresponding posterior
predictive component distributions are given in Figure 5. In analogue to Figure 4, Figure 5
displays the bounds for the probability that a single component, having been put under risk
at time 0, will have failed by time t, after having seen these (partly censored) observations.
For easy comparisons, Figure 5 also contains the prior bounds from Figure 4.
We see that the graphs for M and H do not change dramatically, as there is only one com-
ponent of each in the system to learn from. For C, the bounds have considerably narrowed,
showing the effect of having seen the four observations tC1 = 6, t
C
2 = 7, t
C
3 = t
C
4 = 8
+. The
bounds for P have not narrowed as much; this is due to the two right-censored observations
tP3 = t
P
4 = 8
+; from the viewpoint of the prior, surviving past time 8 is already quite unusual.
6.3 Case 2: surprisingly early failure times
For the second case, with tC1 = 1, t
C
2 = 2, t
P
1 = 0.25, t
P
2 = 0.5 and tnow = 2 (so
tM1 = t
H
1 = t
C
3 = t
C
4 = t
P
3 = t
P
4 = 2
+), we assume to observe surprisingly early failures; the
corresponding posterior predictive component distributions are given in Figure 6. Having
observed the system only until t = 2, the data are not very informative, such that prior and
posterior predictive reliability bounds are very similar. For C, the effect of the early failures
is however still visible, and posterior imprecision, i.e., the range between lower and upper
posterior bound, is notably larger as compared to prior imprecision, and substantially larger
that posterior imprecision in case 1. The effect for P is less pronounced, mainly because
observing tP = (0.25, 0.5, 2+, 2+) for P is less extreme as observing tC = (1, 2, 2+, 2+) for C.
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t
R
(t) Prior
Figure 4. Sets of prior predictive reliability functions for the four component types,
illustrating the choice of prior parameter sets Π(0)k , k = M,H,C,P.
6.4 Case 3: surprisingly late failure times
For the third case, we assume to observe surprisingly late failures, namely tC1 = 11,
tC2 = 12, t
P
1 = 8, t
P
2 = 9, and tnow = 12 (so t
M
1 = t
H
1 = t
C
3 = t
C
4 = t
P
3 = t
P
4 = 12
+); the
corresponding posterior predictive component distributions are given in Figure 7. Having
observed the system for a much longer time than in case 2, the data contain now much
more information, resulting in considerable differences between prior and posterior bounds.
The effect of these surprisingly late failures is most prominent for P, with a set considerably
shifted to the right and having very wide posterior bounds. The posterior set for C also
indicates that, after having seen these late failures, one expects type C components to fail
much later. This effect is also visible for M and H, but is weaker for them as there is only
one component of each in the system.
6.5 Reliability bounds for the running system
Figure 8 depicts the set of prior system reliability functions, together with the sets of
posterior system reliability function for the three cases, on a scale of elapsed time since
system startup. Due to this time scale, posterior system reliability is 1 at tnow, as it is known
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Figure 5. Sets of posterior predictive reliability functions for the four component types
for observations in line with prior expectations (case 1).
that the system has survived until tnow = 8, 2, 12 in case 1,2,3, respectively. For all three
cases, the posterior bounds drop faster after tnow than the prior bounds drop after t = 0
since the components in the system have aged until tnow and so are expected to fail sooner.
In the case of surprisingly early failures, posterior bounds are mostly within prior bounds,
this is due to tnow being close to 0 and weakly informative data in this scenario; the posterior
bounds are nevertheless wider than those for case 1; posterior bounds are widest for case 3.
This most visible in Figure 9, which shows Rsys(t) − Rsys(t), the difference between upper
and lower bound of prior and posterior system reliability. The left panel shows imprecision
on the scale of elapsed time since system startup like in Figure 8; the right panel shows
imprecision on the scale of prospective time instead, indicating how far in the future periods
are for which estimation of system reliability is most uncertain. Posterior imprecision is
indeed considerably lower in case 1, where failure times were more or less like expected. On
the prospective timescale, one can see that periods of heightened uncertainty are closer to
the present for the posteriors, while uncertainty is considerably reduced for periods further
in the future.
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Figure 6. Sets of posterior predictive reliability functions for the four component types
for surprisingly early failures (case 2).
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we presented a robust Bayesian approach to reliability estimation for systems
of arbitrary layout, and showed how the use of sets of prior distributions results in increased
imprecision, i.e., more cautious probability statements, in case of prior-data conflict (cases 2
and 3 in Section 6), while giving more precise reliability bounds when prior and data are
in agreement (case 1 in Section 6). The parameters through which prior information is
encoded have a clear interpretation and are thus easily elicited, either directly or with help
of the prior predictive (22). Calculation of lower and upper predictive system reliability
bounds is tractable, requiring only a simple K-dimensional box-constrained optimization in
Equation (21).
We think that increased imprecision is an appropriate tool for mirroring prior-data con-
flict when considering sets of priors as is done in both the robust Bayesian and imprecise
probability framework. We want to emphazise, however, that this tool may be useful al-
ready for just highlighting ‘conflict’ between multiple information sources, and that we do
not think that the resulting set of posteriors, although it can form a meaningful basis, must
necessarily be used for all consequential inferences, as a strict Bayesian would posit. We be-
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Figure 7. Sets of posterior predictive reliability functions for the four component types
for surprisingly late failures (case 3).
lieve an analyst is free to reconsider any aspect of a model (of which the choice of prior can
be seen to form a part) after seeing the data, and so may use our method only for becoming
aware of a conflict between prior and data.
The employed robust Bayesian setting provides many further modelling opportunities
beyond the explicit reaction to prior-data conflict. These opportunities have not yet been
explored and provide a wide field for further research. An example is our currently ongoing
investigation into extending the present model to allow also for an appropriate reflection of
very strong agreement between prior and data (Walter and Coolen 2016).
There are many aspects to further develop in our analysis and modeling. The general
approaches used in this paper, namely the use of sets of conjugate priors for component
lifetime models and the survival signature to calculate the system reliability, can be used
with other parametric component lifetime distributions that form a canonical exponential
family, since for such distributions, a canonical conjugate prior using the same canonical
parameters n(0) and y(0) can be constructed, for details see, e.g., Bernardo and Smith (2000,
p. 202 and 272f), or Walter (2013, p. 8). Likewise straightforward to implement is, e.g.,
the analysis of the effect of replacing failed components in the system on system reliability
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Figure 8. Sets of prior and posterior system reliability functions for the three cases on
a time showing time elapsed since system startup.
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Figure 9. Imprecision of prior and posterior system reliability sets.
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bounds. Criteria for the trade-off between the cost of replacement and the gain in reliability
would have to be adapted for the interval output of our model, leading to very interesting
research questions.
To estimate the shape parameters βk together with the scale parameters λk, one could
follow standard Bayesian approaches and use a finite discrete distribution for βk. Developing
this together with suitable sets of priors for λk, in particular to show the effect of prior-data
conflict, is another interesting challenge for future research.
Another further important aspect in system reliability we have not accounted for yet is
the possibility of common-cause failures, i.e., failure events where several components fail at
the same time due to a shared or common root cause. This could be done by combining the
common-cause failure model approaches of Troffaes et al. (2014) and Coolen and Coolen-
Maturi (2015).
On a more abstract level, the choice for the set of prior parameters (generating the set of
prior component failure distributions) as [n
(0)
k , n
(0)
k ]× [y(0)k , y
(0)
k ] has the advantage of allowing
for easy elicitation and tractable inferences, but it may not be suitable to reflect certain
kinds of prior knowledge. Also, as studied in (Walter et al. 2011) and (Walter 2013, §3.1),
the shape of the prior parameter set has a crucial influence on model behaviour like the
severity of prior-data conflict reaction. As noted in (Walter 2013, pp. 66f), more general
prior parameter set shapes are possible in principle, but may be more difficult to elicit and
make calculations more complex.
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